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SCALING PROPERTY WITH PROFESSOR ELLICKSON
Lee Anne Fennell*
Bob Ellickson's work is so wide-ranging, thought-provoking, and important that
doing it justice here is an impossibility-so I will admit defeat on that score at the
outset. Instead, I want to focus on one recurring theme that runs through much of his
scholarship and that has been especially important to my own thinking about property:
that scale matters. Ellickson cashes out this idea in many rich and interesting ways,
but I will use three broad propositions that emerge from his work as a way of orga-
nizing my remarks. First, that the scale at which activities and events unfold should
drive choices among property arrangements. Second, that the institutions for manag-
ing property should be scaled to fit the relevant action. Third, that scale should factor
into our normative evaluations of the societal impacts of various institutional and
property arrangements.
I. SCALING PROPERTY REGIMES
Ellickson's 1993 article, Property in Land,' is a masterful theoretical treatment
of the problem of scale as it relates to property ownership arrangements. One of its
central insights is that structuring access to property, through the positioning of bound-
aries or otherwise, is not a zero-sum game.2 Resource users can collectively achieve
gains by appropriately configuring property arrangements-whether as individual
owners working small parcels, households on somewhat larger tracts, small groups
on tiny limited-access commons, or much larger groups sharing common fields.'
* Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School. I thank Catherine Kiwala for
excellent research assistance.
Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315 (1993).
2 See, e.g., id. at 1320 (stating the thesis that "close-knit groups" will develop efficient
rules and explaining that this thesis "envisions that people on the ground recognize that property
in land is a positive-sum game and play it cooperatively").
3 See id. at 1322-26. Ellickson's list of property forms also includes an open-access
regime "in which privileges of entry are universal," as well as an "anticommons," defined as
"a land regime in which each member of a public owns a right to exclude, and consequently
for which no one owns a privilege of entry and use." Id. at 1322 & n. 22. As Ellickson notes,
Frank Michelman first formulated the anticommons idea. See id at 1322 n. 22 (citing Frank
I. Michelman, Ethics, Economics, and the Law of Property, in NOMOS XXIV: ETHICS,
ECONOMICS, AND THE LAW 3, 6 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1982)).
Michael Heller later adapted and extended the anticommons concept. See, e.g., Michael A.
Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets,
111 HARv. L. REv. 621 (1998).
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The trick is to scale land holdings so that the most valuable activities can be pursued
most efficiently. Following Harold Demsetz, Ellickson explains that individually-
owned parcels do a good job of containing both the positive and negative impacts of
"small events" such as the cultivation of tomato plants, and thus successfully align
the parcel owner's incentives for such events.4 Individual parcel ownership also works
comparatively well in addressing a "medium event" like building a dam across a
stream, given the relative ease of bargaining with an affected neighbor or two, and
the relative difficulty of getting a larger group to agree to anything.5
But Ellickson does not uncritically conclude that individual parcel ownership
is always best. Instead, he considers how changes in returns to scale could alter the
picture. Growing individual tomato plants may not require much land, but there are
economies of scale for some land uses, such as grazing. 6 Bigger parcels also econo-
mize on fencing,7 but introduce new governance challenges within the fence.' Whether
moving the fence outward is worth it depends in part on whether coordination across
large areas will be required to use the land optimally-if so, then it may be easier to
coordinate with co-owners inside an expanded fence than to strike bargains with a
multiplicity of separate parcel holders.9 In making these tradeoffs, Ellickson explains,
we want to know not only about economies of scale in production, but also about the
4 Ellickson, supra note 1, at 1325 & fig. 2, 1327-28. As Ellickson notes, Demsetz
had observed that individual ownership internalizes these kinds of events to the owner, but
had not focused on the possibility of boundary encroachments. Id. at 1327 (citing Harold
Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. EcoN. REv. (PAPERS & PROC.) 347,
354-56 (1967)). Crucial to Ellickson's argument, then, is the proposition that "[m]onitoring
boundary crossings is easier than monitoring the behavior of persons situated inside bound-
aries." Id. at 1327-28; see also id. at 1328-30 (discussing the costs of establishing and
enforcing boundaries).
' Here too, Ellickson builds on the work of Demsetz, who argued that group ownership
that requires coordination among many would have higher transaction costs than individual
ownership in addressing events that affect only a couple of parcels. See id. at 1330-31.
Ellickson qualifies this point by noting that neighbors, as bilateral monopolists, may act strate-
gically in ways that raise transaction costs. Id. at 1330 n. 56. He then adds two observations
that buttress Demsetz's analysis: that neighbors occupying adjacent land parcels in an indi-
vidual ownership regime are likely to share a more closely-knit relationship that will smooth
bargaining than would a larger group operating the land communally, and that these neighbors
are also likely to have more information about relatively localized events than would a larger
group. Id. at 1331.
6 See id. at 1332.
This is a purely geometric point. See id. at 1332 n. 62.
s See id at 1334; see also Henry E. Smith, Exclusion Versus Governance: Two Strategies
for Delineating Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STuD. S453 (2002) (analyzing and modeling the
interplay between boundary exclusion and internal governance).
' Ellickson, supra note 1, at 1334 ("A landowner who shifts a general-purpose boundary
outward increases his burdens of internal management but decreases his burdens of external
coordination.").
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prevalence of "large events" (he gives the example of a "smoky fire") that are likely
to affect many parcels simultaneously.'0
In Ellickson's recent work on the household, he shows that similar scale consid-
erations emerge in choosing the number of people with whom to share a dwelling."
There are economies of scale in sharing amenities like space, shelter, heat, and meals,
but diseconomies with respect to privacy, control over one's environment, and pursuit
of preferred activities.' 2 If the household is mostly about fostering intimate relation-
ships and personal expression and less about efficiently producing and consuming heat
and food, the choice will be made differently than if the priorities are flipped-and
changes in social and economic conditions could alter the equation.'3
A foundational challenge, of course, is that multiple activities with varying effi-
cient scales are often pursued simultaneously or sequentially on particular property
holdings.' 4 As Ellickson observes, there are a variety of strategies available to contend
with this problem, none of them costless. Sometimes spatial "layering" is possible,
as when different rules apply to crossing property boundaries at ground level than to
crossing property boundaries in aircraft.' 5 Sometimes special-purpose subdividing
is possible, as when members of a household share common areas but have their
"own" rooms, or when commonly grazed land is divided up into individually farmed
strips as it was in the medieval commons.' 6 Because the values of different uses
'0 Id. at 1334-35.
" See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, THE HOUSEHOLD: INFORMAL ORDER AROUND THE HEARTH
(2008) [hereinafter ELLICKSON, HOUSEHOLD]; Robert C. Ellickson, Unpacking the Household:
Informal Property Rights Around the Hearth, 116 YALE L.J. 226 (2006) [hereinafter Ellickson,
Unpacking].
2 See Ellickson, Unpacking, supra note 11, at 260, 287-92; see also BRENDAN
O'FLAHERTY, CITY EcONOMICS 348-49 (2005) (comparing houses to "miniature cities" and
examining tradeoffs between economies of scale in housing and concerns about congestion,
security, coordination, and privacy).
'" Ellickson, Unpacking, supra note 11, at 290-91 (explaining how access to widespread
trade with "outside vendors" would "tend to reduce both the number of household occupants
and the scope of household production"). Ellickson separately considers how the scale of
ownership-as distinct from occupancy-might be optimized. Id. at 292-93.
" See Ellickson, supra note 1, at 1332 ("Decisions on where to set land boundaries are
fiendishly complex because most tracts of land are suited to multiple uses for which scale effi-
ciencies vary."); id. at 1332-33 (giving an example in which property has one optimal scale for
use as a college and a different optimal scale for exploitation of the underlying oil reserves);
see also Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Reconfiguring Property in Three Dimensions,
75 U. CHI. L. REv. 1015, 1024 (2008) (discussing Ellickson's example); Dean Lueck, The
Economic Nature of Wildlife Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 291, 300-03 (1989) (examining the
problem of multiple efficient scales as it relates to wildlife law).
'" See Ellickson, supra note 1, at 1363-64.
16 Id. at 1333-34, 1372 (discussing "internal subdivisions" such as bedrooms); id. at
1388-91 & fig. 3 (discussing and depicting the medieval open-field system and examining
a variety of economic explanations for the arrangement). See generally Henry E. Smith,
2009]
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change over time, rules that determine how easily property can be reconfigured-
broken up or aggregated-also become important.'
7
Ultimately, some form of institutional arrangement becomes necessary to address
impacts that cannot, for reasons relating to optimal scale, be fenced out.' 8 For ex-
ample, property is of little value without a system of roads to which common access
is provided, yet the roads themselves are useless (or worse) unless people can coor-
dinate their behavior while on them.' 9 Other goods, like neighborhood ambience,
occur at a scale larger than the individual parcel and must be managed somehow.20
This brings us to the next facet of Ellickson's work that I want to discuss-the
relationship between scale and institutional choice.
II. SCALING INSTITUTIONS
Because the simultaneous occurrence of events at multiple scales is the rule rather
than the exception, legal institutions are called upon to do a great deal more than
simply enforce boundaries around whatever property ownership regime is in place.
Even if parcelization achieves internalization for small-scale events, and medium-
scale events can be mostly handled through low-transaction-cost deals among a small
number of neighbors,2' there will still be larger events that require a coordinated re-
sponse.22 In these cases, the law steps in with governance rules, through mechanisms
like nuisance law, zoning, and covenants.23 Deciding on the appropriate institutional
Semicommon Property Rights and Scattering in the Open Fields, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 131
(2000) (explaining how the need to conduct activities at different scales while controlling self-
serving behavior led to the development of a "semicommons" arrangement in the medieval
open fields).
'7 See Ellickson, supra note 1, at 1333, 1374-75; Michelman, supra note 3, at 15-16. This
point relates to a large body of work in property theory, including the work that Michael Heller
and others have pursued on the anticommons. See, e.g., Michael A. Heller, The Boundaries
of Private Property, 108 YALE L.J. 1163, 1172 (1999); Heller, supra note 3, at 667-79.
"8 See Ellickson, supra note 1, at 1333-34.
'9 Id. at 1381-87. For a discussion of the significance of roads and other public spaces
that facilitate interaction, see generally Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom,
Commerce and Inherently Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 711 (1986).
20 See Ellickson, supra note 1, at 1386 (noting that residential associations set rules for
common areas).
21 See supra text accompanying notes 4-5.
22 Ellickson, supra note 1, at 1333-35.
23 Ellickson has written extensively on land use controls, both public and private. See,
e.g., ROBERT C. ELLICKSON & VicKi L. BEEN, LAND USE CONTROL: CASES AND MATERIALS
(3d ed. 2005); Robert C. Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and
Fines as Land Use Controls, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 681 (1973); Robert C. Ellickson, Cities and
Homeowners Associations, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1519 (1982) [hereinafter Ellickson, Cities and
Homeowners Associations].
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response requires close attention to matters of scale, Ellickson argues.24 Analogizing
to land boundary problems, he explains how the scale at which local public goods are
produced and the significance of spillover effects help in setting optimal territorial
boundaries for governance.25 Here, he invokes the principle of subsidiarity-the
notion of devolving authority over a given matter to the smallest unit capable of
handling it competently.26
Ellickson has done a great deal of creative thinking about the workings of real
and proposed institutional arrangements, especially those operating at relatively small
territorial scales. One such institution is the household itself, which he describes as
"a pint-sized community with proven staying power."'27 Moving to a somewhat larger
scale, he has explored how private neighborhoods governed by homeowners asso-
ciations differ from municipalities, not only in their territorial scale, but also in the
way in which political power is allocated. 8 Ellickson's 1998 article, New Institutions
for OldNeighborhoods, identifies an unfilled "niche" in between the household and
the neighborhood for an institutional form that he dubs Block Improvement Districts
(BLIDs).2 9 He suggests that BLIDs might usefully borrow institutional templates from
residential community associations to achieve gains at the sub-neighborhood level.3"
Ellickson cites a variety of advantages for a scaled-down institutional approach to
community governance, including the possibility that block-level institutions could
better provide highly localized public goods like "block-watch programs," could cater
to more idiosyncratic local interests, and could strengthen both informal social capital
bonds and community involvement in the governance process itself.3
Of course, whether a given institution is appropriately scaled depends on the local
public goods and local impacts under consideration. For example, a community asso-
ciation that works well internally may produce externalities for outsiders.32 And, once
again, the problem of multiple efficient scales emerges: a block-level institution might
be appropriately scaled to fix sidewalks and maintain playgrounds, but quite inappro-
priately scaled to tackle larger transportation or housing challenges.33 This situation
24 See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, New Institutionsfor Old Neighborhoods, 48 DUKE L.J.
75, 80 (1998) ("Like other people, urban residents recognize that the ideal scale of governance
varies with the task at hand.").
25 Id. at 79-80.
26 See id. at 80.
27 Ellickson, supra note 1, at 1362. For a detailed examination of the household's institu-
tional characteristics and control mechanisms, see Ellickson, Unpacking, supra note 11 and
ELLICKSON, HOUSEHOLD, supra note 11.
28 See generally Ellickson, Cities and Homeowners Associations, supra note 23.
29 See Ellickson, supra note 24, at 80-85.
30 Id.
1' Id. at 82-85.
32 Id. at 85.
" See id.
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may be addressed in the institutional context with, in Ellickson's words, "nested terri-
torial institutions operating at varying scales."'
Decisions about the dispersal of decision-making authority often run into ques-
tions about social justice, however, bringing us to a third way in which Ellickson's
work illuminates the potential significance of scale.
Ill. SCALING SOCIAL POLICY
Whether a particular community is described as segregated or integrated, homo-
geneous or heterogeneous, exclusionary or inclusive, can depend critically on the scale
of observation. In a recent commentary on a book chapter of mine,35 Ellickson offered




3. cluster of several residential blocks
4. neighborhood (roughly, an elementary school attendance area)
5. submunicipality (roughly, a high school attendance area)
6. entire municipality (situated within a much larger urban area)36
There is an interesting interplay between homogeneity and heterogeneity as one zooms
in or out, as Ellickson and his co-author, Vicki Been, have pointed out.37 What they
term a "Waring Blender model" of land use--one that "call[s] for all land uses and all
types of households to be represented in each neighborhood in proportion to their rep-
resentation in the entire metropolitan area"--would achieve heterogeneity at a small
scale, but would produce homogeneity at a larger scale.3" As Ellickson and Been
explain, "the Waring Blender model produces great diversity within neighborhoods,
but no diversity between neighborhoods, and thus may limit the variety of residential
choices available to households."39
"' Id. at 80; see also Elinor Ostrom, Design Principles of Robust Property Rights
Institutions: What Have We Learned?, in PROPERTY RIGHTS AND LAND POLICIEs 25, 36
(Gregory K. Ingram & Yu-Hung Hong eds., 2009) (discussing the design principle of"nested
enterprises," in which "larger institutions exist to govern the interdependencies among
smaller units").
3' Robert C. Ellickson, The Puzzle ofthe Optimal Social Composition ofNeighborhoods,
in THE TIEBOUT MODEL AT FIFTY: ESSAYS IN PUBLIC ECONOMICS IN HONOR OF WALLACE
OATES 199 (William A. Fischel ed., 2006) (commenting on Lee Anne Fennell, Exclusion's
Attraction: Land Use Controls in Tieboutian Perspectives, in THE TIEBOUT MODEL AT FIFTY,
supra, at 163).
36 Id. at 205 (internal footnote omitted).
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Permitting more homogeneity at smaller scales not only leaves open the possi-
bility of more heterogeneity at the next scale up, Ellickson argues, but also facilitates
more bonding among community members.40 There are obviously many difficult
normative judgments in play on these points, and plenty of room for disagreement.
But the general proposition that scale might matter to at least some of our social policy
assessments has intuitive resonance. Few would argue that the same evaluative cri-
teria should apply to a household as to a city. The point applies not only to questions
of residential association, but also to other sorts of land uses about which people may
disagree. For example, in discussing how particular sorts of urban activity, such as
panhandling and bench squatting, might be treated, Ellickson hypothesized a system
of Red, Yellow, and Green Zones in which decreasing amounts of street disorder
would be permitted.4 The desirability and appropriate scale of such a scheme are
open to question, but there is a palpable difference between restricting the behavior
of a homeless person in a single block occupied by a school and applying those same
restrictions across an entire neighborhood or city.42
In all of these contexts, however, it is essential that arguments about appropriate
scale remain sensitive to the cumulative effects of localized policies.43 To say that
every neighborhood need not be a microcosm of the optimal metropolitan-wide mix
of uses is one thing; to grant each neighborhood autonomy to decide which uses it
will exclude is quite another. As I have argued elsewhere, exclusion is itself a lim-
ited resource and draws made on it by one group can have important spillovers for
other groups." This observation suggests a potential divergence between the optimal
scale at which social phenomena should be evaluated and the optimal scale at which
social policy should be formulated and implemented.
For example, Ellickson and Been's critique of the "Waring Blender" model
assumes (following the Tiebout hypothesis) that a rich variety of distinctive yet
40 Ellickson, supra note 35, at 204 (citing ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE
COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY 22-24 (2000)) (discussing Robert
Putnam's distinction between "bonding" and "bridging" social capital and noting potential
tradeoffs between the two).
41 Robert C. Ellickson, Controlling Chronic Misconduct in City Spaces: OfPanhandlers,
Skid Rows, and Public-Space Zoning, 105 YALE L.J. 1165, 1220-22 (1996).
42 For one thing, as Jeremy Waldron has cogently pointed out, homeless people cannot
exist unless they can perform necessary acts (such as sleeping) somewhere. See Jeremy
Waldron, Homelessness and the Issue ofFreedom, 39 UCLA L. REv. 295,296-302 (1991).
4" See Mary Anne Case, Community Standards and the Margin of Appreciation, 25
HUMAN RIGHTS L.J. 10, 15 (2005) (suggesting that Schad v. Borough of Mt. Ephraim, 452
U.S. 61 (1981), "appears to stand for a principle something like the categorical imperative:
Anyjuridical unit of local government authorized to make independent zoning decisions may
only engage in exclusionary zoning or regulation that would be constitutional if universal").
4 Lee Anne Fennell, Properties of Concentration, 73 U. CHI. L. REv. 1227, 1281-85
(2006).
2009)
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attractive communities would otherwise spontaneously appear.45 But a wealth-
stratified ladder of communities that includes places no one would affirmatively
choose to live" may instead emerge from a system that enables fragmented com-
munities to exclude at will." Shutting off the social planner's "blender" to permit
small-scale homogeneity does not automatically produce a diverse array of alternatives
at the next scale up; communities left to their own devices (and given exclusionary
zoning tools) might tend to closely resemble each other in their homogeneity.4" Avoid-
ing these results and preserving a meaningful range of residential choice requires some
type of system-wide coordination. Such coordination need not take a command-and-
control form, however, and Ellickson's innovative work on alternative mechanisms
could have real traction in this context.49
CONCLUSION
These brief remarks have scarcely scratched the surface of one element of
Ellickson's scholarship, yet I hope that they have offered a glimpse of the creativity
and power of his ideas. As this symposium attests, Ellickson has made pathbreaking
contributions in many areas, but the topic I have chosen to address here holds special
significance. Indeed, deeply influenced by Ellickson's scholarship, I have elsewhere
suggested that scale is the unifying theme of the commons, anticommons, and semi-
commons templates that scholars employ to understand and resolve all manner of
resource dilemmas.5 ° Of course, I am not alone in recognizing Ellickson's scale-
related contributions: many other scholars have built on those insights in studying
45 See ELLIcKsoN & BEEN, supra note 23, at 771 (citing Charles Tiebout, A Pure Theory
ofLocal Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956)); see also Ellickson, supra note 35, at 201
(observing that the "Waring blender" approach would not only do away with "distinctively
black or white neighborhoods" but would also mean "no Chinatowns, no blue-collar neighbor-
hoods, no gay neighborhoods, no graduate-student ghettos, no clusters of struggling artists"--a
vision of the world that Ellickson's students consistently reject "as boring and too restrictive
on freedom of association").
46 See Gerald E. Frug, City Services, 73 N.Y.U. L. REv. 23, 31 (1998).
47 There is a vast literature on exclusionary zoning. See, e.g., Jeffrey M. Lehmann,
Reversing Judicial Deference Toward Exclusionary Zoning: A Suggested Approach, 12 J.
AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 229 (2003); Henry A. Span, How the Courts
Should Fight Exclusionary Zoning, 32 SETON HALL L. REv. 1 (2001).
48 See Ann R. Markusen, Class and Urban Social Expenditure: A Marxist Theory of
Metropolitan Government, in MARXISM AND THE METROPOLIS 82, 83-84 (William K. Tabb
& Larry Sawyers eds., 2d ed. 1984).
49 See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls: An Economic and Legal
Analysis, 86 YALE L. J. 385,410-14,436-38,467-70, 505-10 (1977); see also Fennell, supra
note 44, at 1266 (citing and discussing Ellickson's work).
50 Lee Anne Fennell, Commons, Anticommons, Semicommons, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK
ON THE ECONOMICS OF PROPERTY LAW (Kenneth Ayotte & Henry E. Smith eds., forthcoming
2009) available at http://ssm.com/abstract= 1348267.
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the workings of property, and in evaluating policies and institutions for responding to
property dilemmas.5' Although Ellickson's conclusions have not garnered universal
agreement (whose have?), his careful and curiosity-driven examination of ideas has
earned the respect of every legal scholar I know.
I could go on and on, but the scale of my task here is small, and I trust that readers
have gotten the point by now: Ellickson's career qualifies as a very "large event" in
legal scholarship, and one that has had, and will continue to have, a profound influence
on how we think about human arrangements for living and working together.
"' See, e.g., ROBERT H. NELSON, PRIvATE NEIGHBORHOODS AND THE TRANSFORMATION
OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT (2005); John A. Lovett, Property and Radically Changed
Circumstances, 74 TENN. L. REv. 463 (2007); Richard C. Schragger, The Limits ofLocalism,
100 MICH. L. REv. 371 (2001); Christopher Serkin, Local Property Law: Adjusting the Scale
of Property Protection, 107 COLUM. L. REv. 883 (2007); Amy Sinden, The Tragedy of the
Commons and the Myth of a Private Property Solution, 78 U. COLO. L. REv. 533, 5 87-94
(2007).
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